From biorhetorics to zoorhetorics by Pain, Stephen
Sign Systems Studies 37(3/4), 2009 
 
 
From biorhetorics to zoorhetorics 
Stephen Pain 
Biorhetorics Odense 
24 Sleppevangen, 5270 Odense, Denmark  
e-mail: st3pen@yahoo.com 
 
 
Abstract. The present article aims to introduce the field of “Zoorhetorics”, as a 
particular case of Biorhetorics, earlier introduced by the author in the academic 
world. A brief explanation will be provided of its aims, methods and models, while 
particular attention will be devoted to the concept of “sustainable good”, 
considered crucial in both the “Bio-” and “Zoorhetorics” formulations.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Biorhetorics is an applied branch of classical rhetoric founded by the 
author in the 1990s (see, for instance, Pain 2002). It develops from 
animal representation a natural argumentation system that can be 
applied in conflict resolution in human-animal encounters and in 
conservation issues. There is a simple horizontal equation based on 
rhetorical equivalency. It postulates that the force of a successful 
argument is equal to the distance from the position of the audience at 
X to the required position Y. The tropes and figures, as well as the 
central components of the argument can be measured as factors of the 
force. The goal is a sustainable good.  
Biorhetorics, in its original formulation, was aimed to be applied in 
the biological sciences, while here, under the ambit of zoosemiotics, it 
seems more appropriate to limit it to animals and therefore one may 
think to the neologism “zoorhetorics”.  
Rhetoric, like all forms of reasoning, approaches or methods, 
emanates from language and logic. This would immediately exclude 
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most of the subjects of the animal kingdom, where few are capable of 
symbol manipulation that is not in a fixed referential system, that is, 
this symbol equals that and nothing else. Classical rhetoric includes so 
many examples of arbitrariness that it seems almost embarrassing to 
suggest that animals use rhetoric to achieve ends. They do not. What 
zoosemiotics aims to do is present a working framework that can be 
useful firstly in working with animals, and also living with them.  
Let us begin with some straightforward examples. Say a starfish 
that is eating coral on the barrier reef. Scientists working with mea-
sures to prevent the spread of this devastation will study and observe 
the ecology, the individual actors, and then hypothesise about a 
solution, test this in the laboratory and finally in the field. But how 
does one go about “persuading” a starfish not to eat coral? We must 
first consider how the starfish is directed to its prey. Something about 
how the “coral” is represented to the starfish, and then begin to ela-
borate a biological argument. At this stage, we can input a sustainable 
good. This sustainable good is the idealised state of the coral for 
balance in the marine ecology. What growth is sufficient for the area? 
Once we know these parameters, then the goal would be to reduce 
consumption of the coral to an acceptable level. This is extremely 
difficult because the coral is a staple part of the starfish's diet. Below is 
a working model of zoorhetorics (Fig. 1): 
 
 
Figure 1. Working model of zoorhetorics. 
Stephen Pain  500
We can now begin to brainstorm and go over possible solutions. Each 
of the components used by the scientist/rhetor will be measured as a 
factor of the force of the argument, which is necessary to “move” the 
starfish audience to the target position. Let’s say that we establish a 
quota of coral as a sustainable good, then our objective would be to 
find a biological argument to achieve that. We must know our 
audience well and their representation systems. An ethogram needs to 
be constructed so as to map out how the starfish navigates, locates and 
feeds (Fig. 2). This will supply the data for constructing topoi etc.  
 
 
Figure 2. Ethogram mapping the necessary data. 
 
 
Once we have the raw data we can test the development of an argu-
ment. For example, a simile of the navigation route. Here the starfish 
is directed to an area — say the quota region of the coral colony where 
least damage might be done and which entails a sustainable good. 
With little cost, a buoy or a submersible could leak out clouds of 
attractants to direct the starfish. Zoorhetorics and biorhetorics are not 
implying that animals actually have the ability to argue or persuade, 
but they do in their interactions have evolved behavioural and 
communication strategies. These have been analysed by zoologists 
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using quantitative models predicated on cost and benefit. These metric 
approaches are of course more elegant, here the proposal is to get the 
researcher in the laboratory and the field to use her insight to elabo-
rate novel solutions using informal reasoning — and inputting a 
sustainable good. It would seem to counter scientific practice to input 
a teleology of a good, however in scientific protocol, practice and 
policy, the three “ps” of science, there are objectives that include 
taking into account the welfare of an animal or environmental con-
cerns. The zoorhetorics model has those three “ps” in mind.  
 
 
2. Nature of sustainable good 
 
We might at this juncture consider the models used in animal com-
munication and behaviour studies, indeed the various mathematical 
models behind evolutionary theory. These often discuss the function 
or form in terms of costs and benefits to the animal. When one uses 
the same terms and language in economics, we are fully aware of the 
nature of a good, because microeconomics and macroeconomics are 
in the service of economic philosophies, which have prescribed 
teleologies. Disputes about the value and goal of traits or adaptation in 
evolution arise due to the fact that the mathematical models derived 
from economics are not truly independent of ethics and metaphysics. 
They are situated within the context of diminishing resources — 
factors of the scarcity of natural resources.  
An animal’s life is within this economy. Since we see ourselves as 
custodians of the planet — an example of what Peter Singer would 
claim to be speciesism, we evaluate things according to our conception 
of what is valuable to us. In short what is an anthropocentric good. Of 
course animals and plants are at liberty. That is the pretence. They are 
not. We are at this stage where we have more or less total domination 
of the planet. Yet, as a species, we do not share consensus about the 
nature of the good. Billions of people believe that the good is a 
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metaphysical one rather than a material good. For them, science and 
its goals are subject to Gods and beliefs. On the other hand, empi-
ricists believe that Science is the servant of a material good. However, 
this is still an anthropocentric good. The goal of obtaining a truth is 
contextualised within the frame of a material good. We measure a 
scientific truth by how good it is according to its anthropocentric 
value.  
Let us now look at a typical communication dyad say between two 
fish. We can assess the “signal” between the sender and receiver in 
terms of the costs in evolutionary and development terms. We assess 
this by looking at the population and working out over a period of 
time whether this form of communication has helped or hindered the 
growth. We can also look at the energetics. Literally a calorific 
approach, for example, how much energy does it require to grunt or 
display? The benefit is ultimately reproductive, that is, how much does 
this grunt or display assist in the furthering of the species. The 
benchmark is sex. Yet, one level higher, the ecologists will study the 
communication in terms of how the act impacts upon the ecological 
process, a process that has economic checks and balances, situated 
within an anthropocentric material (sustainable good) — that is, the 
balance of Gaia (a metaphysical good?)(Fig. 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. i. Value and Species; ii. Communication and Ethics   
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Throughout zoology the economic criteria are determining the focus 
and direction of research. For example, in the laboratory, the scientist 
will view the “sacrifice” of a fruit fly as being unimportant. This is not 
only because of the threshold of pain or suffering is much higher in 
invertebrates, but also because of their availability. The more there is 
of an animal or life form, the less valuable it is. A Siberian tiger is more 
valuable than a lion. However, the life of a Siberian tiger would be 
more valuable than say a rarer spider, because of the anthropocentric 
measure of life. If we quantify the two value axes, in a hypothetical 
case we might get (Fig.4): 
 
 
Figure 4. Economic criteria determining the value of life forms. 
 
 
A sustainable good is a compromise between the anthropocentric 
value and the normative economical one that is calculated according 
to the laws of environmental diminishing resources. Consider an 
evolutionary question about design. Can we talk of good design in 
relation to traits? Richard Dawkins would argue no, as this smacks of 
Aristotelian biology. But communication is measured in terms of a 
utilitarian good, that is, effectiveness. We can certainly say that when 
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discussing reception — one radio station is better than another is. We 
would routinely talk of effectiveness and efficiency in physics. Those 
are qualitative judgements based upon our perception. By the same 
analogy, we can talk of the costs to the environment and say that one 
radio station involves more energy than another does. So, the outcome 
maybe that we chose one over the other because of costs and 
perception. Animal communication researchers evaluate animals like 
these radio stations, however they do not assess the sustainable good 
in the act of communication, nor directly in their research. They leave 
those questions to others. It is assumed others will take care of this. 
The aim of the scientist is to fulfil a discrete task. In this the scientist is 
right. One cannot use rhetoric to measure communication. Rhetoric 
cannot build tape-recorders or spectrometers.  However it can bridge 
the quantitative and qualitative through employment of informal logic.  
Going back to the communication dyad of the fish. The end of 
zoological science is to provide a faithful and testable/repeatable ac-
count of the communication as grounded within evolutionary theory. 
We wish to achieve results that can be falsified, and ones that can 
provide us with data for generalisation and prediction. The more 
generalised the data, the greater the yield in prediction. Predictability 
is a value and a perceived good in itself. It colours how we view the 
animals. If they show greater idiosyncratic or exceptional behaviour, 
they might scupper the results. This demand for generalised predicta-
bility is not necessarily an economic good. It is an anthropocentric 
good. Indeed, in most cases research is uneconomic and unsustainable. 
Logic knows of no sustainable good. Rhetoric on the other hand was 
expressly formulated to bear in mind a good.  
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3. The President of the United States and  
a housefly 
 
The President of the United States does not constitute a pest, unless 
you happen to be the president or citizen of a country opposed to 
American goals. A housefly however does constitute a pest. While 
today we associate the housefly mainly with something “troublesome 
or noxious” (the latter being harmful or unwholesome) in the 
Eighteenth century, the pest was directly connected with the plague. In 
Sheridan’s dictionary for example a pest was defined as: 
 
Pest, s. plague, pestilence 
and had several connotations, derived from pest was  
Pester v. a. (to disturb),  
Pesthouse s. plague hospital 
Pestilence, s. plague 
Pestilential, a. infectious  
 
Of course we are conversant with this connection and view the pre-
sence of many flies as unhygienic and a sign of disease or decom-
position. A popular crime author Simon Beckett begins his novel with 
a chilling and clinical view of decomposition — maggots are given star 
billing because they are stomach churning to many readers. With this 
in mind, President Barack Obama’s killing of a fly should win our 
approval. A fly is bad news for health. Again, using the measurement 
of an anthropocentric good, it scores low. It is populous. It is a low 
invertebrate with a very high suffering threshold. It is a pest in a full 
meaning of the word! Yet, what of its economic value? Despite its bad 
press, the fly is very useful in natural economics. It helps to breakdown 
sewerage, rotten meat, food, and its maggots are useful in treatment in 
hospitals. But one pesky fly? Labelled by the President, “a little bugger”. 
How do we deal with the conflict between pest and the target. Notice 
in this case it is retrospective. We now know the impact of the story. 
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The manner in which the President killed the fly and then kicked it to 
one side and the manner in which the television camera recorded the 
event is steeped in politics (Fig. 5).  
 
Figure 5. The Fly and the President 
 
An animal rights group complained immediately. They felt the 
President could have spared the fly’s life. That is of course an 
interesting perspective. Jainists would concur. Yet, despite the seeming 
callousness of the President’s slap and kicking aside of a living 
animal/creature — the majority of us slaughter invertebrates every 
year by the billion.  
What argument could be developed based on a sustainable good to 
change the mind of the President? One might argue the fly is one of 
God’s creatures and is entitled to life, however this is not based on an 
economic good, even if it is ethical. One might argue that it led to 
unfavourable reviews and affected the Presidency. This could be 
persuasive. But given the fact the fly continued to affect the President’s 
performance, it could be outweighed by the value and significance of 
his statements. There is indeed very little to be said in favour of the 
continuance of the fly’s life, unless we invoke ethics/religion and 
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sentimentality. One fly’s demise makes little difference given the 
billions upon billions of flies on the planet. A reasonable person would 
have acted in the same way. A president of course represents a nation 
and his or her acts are read differently. Obama might have been seen 
as a “softie” who it might be said of, “wouldn’t kill a fly”, now he has 
proven that impression wrong. Suppose the fly was a: butterfly, crab, 
octopus, lobster. Would we react differently, aside from how difficult 
it is to kill some of these animals with one deadly blow. We would. 
Because in the first case we consider the butterfly, though not having 
necessarily a higher EQ than a fly, and maybe even having a higher 
threshold of suffering, as more aesthetic pleasing. The crab we re-
cognise as suffering more than a fly. There are laws protecting the 
lobster and octopus as they have more developed nervous systems and 
therefore they suffer more (Pain 2008).  
Therefore, despite the fact these invertebrates may or may not be 
more advanced neurobiologically, we would be more alarmed at their 
death than a housefly. Similarly if the President were to kill a protist — 
few if any would blink an eyelid. Yet, do not all these animals have a 
right to life? Apparently we do not think so. We evaluate animals ac-
cording to the anthropocentric measure (an extrinsic value) — and 
sometimes take into account their economic value — the natural 
intrinsic value. By the way, the President is not a vegetarian and pro-
bably on average eats the flesh or parts of animals three times or more 
a day, indeed if we add up the tally, that would be over 1000 animals a 
year at least. The vast majority would be birds and mammals — in 
other words animals with a lower threshold of pain, social, and with 
relatively high EQ. The manner they are killed is judged humane. 
However there are those who contend the methods are not so humane, 
and prior to their slaughter these animals experience terrible living 
conditions and stress. The fly on the other hand was dispatched 
immediately, in such a manner that it would have not even really felt 
what happened. It does not justify the act, but puts it into a social 
context. Another point is that Americans unlike Africans do not con-
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front so many flies. In the hot climates, flies are swatted continuously, 
to fail to do so, would jeopardise one’s life.  
It is either the fly or one’s health.  
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От биориторики до зоориторики 
 
Цель данной статьи — ввести понятие «зоориторики», которое 
является особым случаем уже распространенного в академическом 
мире автором понятия «биориторики». Кратко объясняются цели, 
методы и модели зоориторики, при этом особое внимание обра-
щаяется на являющееся фундаментальным как в зоо- так и биорито-
рических определениях понятие «непрерывно восполняемое благо».  
 
 
Bioretoorikast zooretoorikani 
 
Käesolea artikkel tutvustab “zooretoorika” mõistet, mis on varem sama autori 
poolt akadeemilises maailmas juba levitatud mõiste “bioretoorika” üks erijuht. 
Artiklis selgitatakse lühidalt zooretoorika eesmärke, meetodeid ja mudeleid, 
kusjuurest erilist tähelepanu pööratakse “jätkusuutliku hüve” mõistele, mis on 
fundamentaalne nii zoo- kui bioretoorilistes määratlustes. 
